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Abstract
The increased use of social media has led to a greater risk of
information exposure that can be exploited by external parties. In
this study, we look at whether there are differences by race and
gender in risk of exposing potentially stigmatizing information.
We conducted a quantitative investigation, where we selected a
random sample of black male, black female, white male, and white
female Facebook profiles in the city of New Orleans, and coded
whether the profiles had potentially stigmatizing information such
as profanity and sexual suggestiveness. We found that there are
significant differences by race and gender in whether Facebook
profiles were public and whether profiles revealed use of
profanity, use of drugs, and religious preferences. Our findings
also show that in some domains African Americans and males are
more at risk of exposure of potentially stigmatizing information.
These findings are significant because they demonstrate another
way in which racial order can be reproduced in American society.
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Introduction
Social media and social networks have
become modern phenomena. To date, over 1.73
billion social networkers fill the cyber-world
with vines, tweets, snaps, and even personal
information—and the number is steadily rising.
Though the increased use of social media has led
to a more closely connected society, it has also
led to a greater risk of information exposure that
can be exploited by college admission
committees, employers, creditors, and even
thieves. In this study, we selected a random
sample of black male, black female, white male,
and white female Facebook profiles in one midsized Southern city and coded whether the
profiles had potentially stigmatizing information
such as profanity and sexual suggestiveness. We
found that there are significant differences by
race and gender in profile privacy and the
amount of stigmatizing information in those
respective profiles. Although we have not tested
for the causal factors as to why these racial and
gender differences exist, our findings do show
that there are particular domains in which
African Americans and males, in general, are
more at risk of exposure of potentially
stigmatizing information. We believe that these
findings are important because they show yet
another way in which racial order can be
reproduced in American society.

Contemporary Privacy Risks:
Literature Review
Privacy on Facebook
In 2004, Mark Zuckerberg launched
Facebook for students at Harvard College; by
2007, Facebook was one of the most used social
networking sites (SNS) in history, with more
than 200 million users worldwide (Curtis, 2013).
By 2011, social media was accessible from
virtually anywhere and had become an integral
part of individuals’ daily lives with more than
550 million people on Facebook, 65 million

tweets sent through Twitter each day, and 2
billion video views every day on YouTube
(Curtis, 2013). However, public sharing of
personal information via social media sites raised
concern over privacy and the risks of low
privacy (Curtis, 2013), especially on Facebook.
Initially, Facebook’s approach to privacy
was “network–centric” (Boyd and Hargittai
2010), meaning that by default, students’ content
was visible to all other students on the same
campus, but no one else. However, after a series
of redesigns, Facebook provided users more
advanced privacy settings to share information
with “No One,” “Friends,” “Friends-of-Friends,”
or a specific “Network” (Boyd & Hargittai,
2010). Despite these settings, research has shown
varying results in regard to individuals’
knowledge of what can be seen on their profiles.
Acquisti and Gross (2006) surveyed a
cohort of college students about privacy and
examined the connections between students’
privacy attitudes, their beliefs about what
information they were sharing in comparison to
what they were actually sharing, and their
general awareness of Facebook’s privacy
mechanisms. They found that 75 percent of users
knew what they were sharing, and the majority
of the participants understood the wide visibility
of their content. However, a significant minority
was “vastly underestimating the reach and
openness of their own profile” (Acquisti &
Gross, 2006). Tufekci (2012) found that about 20
percent of the students surveyed deactivated their
profile at least once, 82 percent had changed the
settings in the last year, and 90 percent of those
made their profile less visible due to privacy or
visibility concern (p. 339). These researchers
surveyed college students and not the general
population, who is likely to be less aware and
educated on the risks of low privacy settings and
wide visibility.
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Raynes–Goldie (2010) argues that “users
are more concerned about being exposed to
people that they know, rather than having their
data accessed by governments and corporations.”
However, today many social networking sites,
such as Facebook, are used by various
companies, organizations, institutions, and
universities to screen prospective employees,
students,
or
connections.
Therefore,
embarrassing, sexually provocative, racist,
sexist, or even religious content on social
networking sites can be used against an
individual in various ways.
Modern Risks of Social Media and Networks
College and employment decisions
In a job interview, recruiters are not
permitted to ask about the candidate’s religious
preference, marital status, or sexual orientation.
While employers are legally prohibited from
asking those questions, many employers check
social media profiles of prospective employees
before making their final decision (Noguchi,
2014).
Many colleges and university admissions
offices have also used data gathered from these
sites to make their decisions. According to
Singer (2014), “Of the 403 undergraduate
admissions officers who were polled by
telephone over the summer, 35 percent said they
had visited an applicant’s social media page.”
Another study found that of the 381 college
admissions officers who answered a telephone
questionnaire in 2013, “31 percent said they had
visited an applicant’s Facebook or other personal
social media page to learn more about them” and
more crucially, 30 percent of the admissions
officers said they had discovered information
that had negatively affected an applicant’s
prospects (Singer 2013). Therefore, depending
on the interviewer or admission counselor’s
preference, the data gathered from these sites

could negatively affect the applicants’ chances of
acceptance or employment.
The basis for negative judgments by
employers and college admission committees
may stem not only from questionable posts
showing drunkenness, profanity, or sexual
explicitness, but also by revealing demographic
features about oneself, such as race, religion, and
political preferences. According to Ambrosino
(2014):
The researchers study created 3,200
resumes for fictitious job applicants and
sent them to prospective employers
through a popular employment Web site.
Each employer was sent four different
applications
containing
varying
biographical information but comparable
job qualifications. The only thing that set
the resumes apart from each other was
the mention of involvement with a
particular religious group, [and] there was
also a control group that contained no
reference at all to religious involvement.
Resumes that mentioned any of the seven
religious affiliations on average received
29 percent fewer emails and 33 percent
fewer phone calls than the control group.
Certain groups did fare worse than others,
though. Muslims, for instance, received
38 percent fewer emails and 54 percent
fewer phone calls than the control group.
According to Wallace, “Reports of religious
discrimination in the American workplace are
increasingly common, [and] in the last 20 years,
religious-based complaints filed by employees
with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission increased from 1,388 in 1992 to
3,790 in 2010” (Ambrosino, 2014).
Revealing party affiliation on social
media may also be a basis for discrimination.
Because politics are so controversial, groups on
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opposing sides tend to view the other in a
negative and judgmental manner. Iyengar and
Westwood (2014) tested the partisanship based
on race and party affiliation and showed that
Americans are partial to those with similar
alignments and characteristics. Americans have
increasingly shown great dislike for people and
groups on the other side of the political divide,
but they do not face any social repercussions for
their biased or open expression of these attitudes.
Iyengar and Westwood (2014) showed that in the
partisan task where the participants had to
choose between a Democrat and Republican high
school
candidate
for
a
scholarship,
“approximately 80 percent of partisans (both
Democrats and Republicans) selected their inparty candidate” (p. 698). These findings suggest
that information gathered from social networks
that reveal an individual’s party or political
preferences could potentially affect decisions
about employment.
Credit decisions and theft
Today, an increasing number of lending
companies are using Facebook, Twitter, and
other social media data to determine a borrower's
creditworthiness or identity (Armour, 2014).
Investors look for potential problems such as
whether applicants put the same job information
on their loan applications, and if they shared on
Facebook that they had been fired by an
employer (Armour, 2014). Alex Sion, president
of New York-based Moven, a mobile-online
banking company, states, “The data we have on
customers via social networks says more about
them than their FICO” (Armour, 2014).
This same information is also used by
criminals to locate, research, and rob their
victims. According to Nashua (2010), 50 home
burglaries were facilitated by a group of suspects
who used social networking sites such as
Facebook to identify victims who posted online
that they would not be home at a certain time
(Police: Thieves Robbed Homes Based On

Facebook, Social Media Sites, 2010). The 2011
report from Credit Sesame showed that, 80
percent of robbers check Twitter, Facebook, or
Google Street View, indicating that social media
is becoming an integral tool for robbers to plan
their next target (Dickinson, 2011). Though the
percentage has continued to increase over the
years, the use or even misuse of their
information could be less detrimental if
individuals increase privacy setting or are more
careful with which information to publish on
these sites (Experian Perspectives Newsletter,
2011). According to Experian:
While some studies estimate that up to a
third of social networkers have posted at
least three pieces of information that puts
them at risk for identity theft, the 2014
Federal Trade Commission study asserts
that the 20-29 year old age bracket
continues to account for 24 percent of all
identity theft cases, with 8 percent of all
cases comprised in the 19 and under age
bracket.
This study also shows that students are
particularly vulnerable to thefts, due to their
eagerness to make friends, meet new people, and
exchange personal information through social
networks (Experian Perspectives Newsletter,
2011). Sharing personal information such as
religious preference, party affiliation, and sexual
orientation, or even excessively liking pages on
Facebook can reveal information that can be
considered private and risky when used by
certain individuals.

Method
To examine whether race and gender
matter in risk of privacy exposure on social
media, we chose to look at Facebook profiles in
one mid-sized Southern city that is majority
African American. To obtain a random sample of
Facebook profiles, we took the top seven most
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popular surnames in this city and queried
Facebook’s “Find People” search tool to get a
sample of profiles with that last surname in our
selected Southern city. For each surname we
chose the first 10 profiles that had profile photos
that in our best judgment were: white male,
white female, black male, and black female. This
gave us 40 profiles per surname. If a profile had
no picture, was racially indeterminate, appeared
to be a joke or satirical profile (e.g. a profile of
William Sherman featuring the Civil War
general), that profile was also skipped.
There is no absolute way of ensuring a
completely random selection of Facebook
profiles. Voter registration lists, for example, are
already biased based on race, income, education,
and age. Even if we were to have a complete list
of residents in the selected city and took a
random sampling from that list, we would have
no assurance that the name we selected from our
list matched the Facebook profile since certain
names are common.

benefit from being connected on Facebook. We
do not believe that there is any particular racial
and gender bias within this sample. Within each
group, Facebook will draw the more socially
connected and socially outgoing. We do not
believe that one particular race or gender
subgroup draws more socially outgoing people
than another. In our sample, white males have a
higher average number of friends. Therefore, one
would assume that the study would be biased
against finding African Americans as having a
higher propensity to reveal information because
of the smaller size of their friendship network.
Even if there are biases in the personality
distribution within each subgroup, we believe the
information is still useful for looking at our
particular question. Within the existing sample
of publicly available Facebook profiles, we
endeavor to find out whether there is a difference
in which racial groups expose more potentially
damaging information.

Results

Surnames are given, not chosen, therefore
we believe that there is no selection bias in the
socio-demographic composition of particular
surnames. In addition, Facebook’s search tool
gave different names with each search, so there
appears to be some randomization in how the
search tool returns names. For each profile, we
examined the basic information displayed about
the person, the likes the person indicated in the
“About” tab of their profile, and the posts the
person made in 2013. We then coded whether the
profile contained profanity, sexually suggestive
material, indicators of the person’s religiosity,
political affiliation, and other potentially
stigmatizing material.

Public Posts
The first hypothesis tests whether race
and gender have an effect on the privacy status
of an individual’s Facebook profile. Public posts
are defined as a person allowing all Facebook
users to see their posts; private posts are not
public to anyone on Facebook. The independent
variables race and gender are specifically
categorized as white male, white female, black
male, and black female. Figure 1 shows that a
higher percentage of black males (89.2 percent)
and black females (90.9 percent), compared to
white males (75.4 percent) and white females
(81.7 percent), have public posts in our sample
of Facebook profiles.

There is bias in that the people who are
on Facebook are not a representative sample of
the people who live in the city. The people we
selected are people who are more likely to be
socially connected, socially outgoing, and derive

The likeliness of public posts as a
function of race and gender is determined in the
logistic regression analyses presented in Figure
2. Because the dependent variable is
dichotomous, the hypothesis is then tested using
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a logistic regression. The difference in race is
significant (p=.013) while gender is insignificant
(p=.39). It is more likely for a black person than
a white person to have a public Facebook page.
Profanity
Any use of the top fifteen common
swearing words on Facebook or close variants
were coded as profanity (see Kirk 2013 for list).
Of the 252 Facebook users with valid public
posts, only 44 (or 17.5 percent) had profanity on
their wall. Figure 3 shows that of these 44, black
males have the largest amount of profanity users
(19), while white females have the smallest (5).
White males have a slightly higher percentage
within their own group (16.4%) compared to
black females (15.2%). As seen in Figure 2,
logistic regression shows that the differences in
both race (.040) and gender (.020) are
significant. Therefore, blacks and males are more
likely to have profanity on their Facebook page
than whites and females.
Religious Posts
The next subcategory of potentially
stigmatizing material was religious posts. Any
posts or statuses that alluded to any religious
affiliation or spiritual preference were coded as
religious. Figure 4 shows 50 percent of all the
black females had some sort of religious post
followed by 38.5 percent of black males, 25
percent of white females, and just 14.8 percent of
white males. The racial differences in religious
posts are supported by the logistic regression
analysis of the variables. With a significant value
to three decimal places, race serves as a predictor
of the presence of religious posts; blacks are
more likely to have religious content than whites.
In contrast, the relationship between gender and
religious posts is not quite significant. Its 0.056
value falls outside the test for significance, 0.05.
Drug Posts
Stigmatizing posts consisted of whether
or not individuals had revealed drug use or

expressed support for drugs. For example, if the
individual mentioned drug use in an approving
manner in their statuses or posts, or if the
individual was photographed or featured in a
photograph depicting the use of drug, it was
coded as a stigmatizing post. Of the 252 public
Facebook profiles in our sample, only 16
purportedly had drug related posts. Figure 5
shows that among the 6.3 percent of users that
had such posts, 7 of them were white males, 8
were black males and only one was a white
female.
The results of the logistic regression
analysis show that while race does not have a
significant relationship with drug posts, gender
does. With a .007 significant value, gender
becomes a relatively good indicator of drug posts
(see Figure 2), with males more likely than
females to have drug-related posts.
Total Stigmatizing Posts
We tested other subcategories of
potentially stigmatizing information such as
revelation of political party, the presence of job
complaints, and sexually explicit posts. Racial
and gender differences in these other categories
were either insignificant (as in political party
affiliation) or there were too few profiles with
such potentially stigmatizing material to produce
significant variation (as with job complaints and
sexually explicit posts).
We also combined our measures into one
overall metric, stigmatizing posts. Stigmatizing
posts are a combination of the variables
profanity, political party, drugs, job complaints,
and sexually explicit posts. Therefore, if the
Facebook user posted any sort of post belonging
to any of these five categories, they are
considered to have stigmatizing posts. According
to the data, white females and black females
have a noticeably smaller percentage than males.
However, logistic regression (Figure 2) shows
that neither race nor gender have significant
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relationships with whether the profile had any
kind of stigmatizing posts. However, analyzing
the individual variables within stigmatizing
variables still supports the original hypothesis
that there are racial and gender differences in the
presence of some kinds of stigmatizing material.

Discussion and Conclusion
We have found significant racial
differences in relation to public profiles and to
publicly reveal profanity and religious content,
with African Americans more likely to reveal
such information. We have also found significant
gender differences in propensity to post profanity
and material related to drug content, with males
more likely to reveal this information. We have
not tested for the causal factors as to why these
racial and gender differences exist. It could be
that these patterns occur because of race, income,
education, or other factors. Class may explain
some of the racial disparity, since African
Americans tend to have lower income and
wealth. Another possibility is that African
Americans tend to be employed in menial jobs in
which employers are unlikely to care about
transgressions in social media. However, income
and employability are probably not the only
factors determining risk of privacy exposure
since gender is an influence as well. The gender
difference could be due to gender norms, or
because of difference in educational attainment
between men and women, with women tending
to have higher educational attainment than men.
We do not have enough evidence to isolate these
potential multiple causes.

awareness of how information on Facebook can
be accessed by others can potentially lead to
African Americans being denied college
admission and employment opportunities
because their Facebook posts tend to be public
and tend to have more profanity and religious
content. Similarly, our studies show that males
are more likely to suffer from revealing profanity
and drug use, which means that, in general, black
males suffer from dual exposure on both racial
and gender grounds. This supports our
hypothesis that there are indeed present gender
and racial risks in privacy exposure on the
Internet, even though the potential causes are
unknown.

However, our findings show that there
are particular domains in which African
Americans and males are more at risk of
exposure of potentially stigmatizing information.
We believe that these findings are important
because they show yet another way in which a
racial hierarchy can be reproduced in the
American society. Our study shows the lack of
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Figure 1. Percent of Public Profiles

Figure 2. Logistic Regression Results for Race and Gender
Race

B
Public	
  Posts
Stigmatizing	
  Posts
Profanity
Religion
Drug

Sig.

Gender

Exp(B)

B

Sig.

Exp(B)

0.91

0.013

2.485

0.306

0.39

1.357

-0.443

0.228

1.371

0.315

0.228

1.371

0.72
1.18

0.04
0

2.054
3.254

-‐0.813
0.0538

0.02
0.056

0.443
1.713

-0.074

0.889

0.929

-2.826

0.007

0.059
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Figure 3. Percent of Profiles with Profanity Use

Figure 4. Percent of Profiles with Religious Content
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Figure 5. Percent of Profiles with Drug Content
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